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COMMENTS

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WISCONSIN'S
NONECONOMIC DAMAGE LIMITATION
INTRODUCTION

The early 1970s saw the first wave of what is now known as the medical
malpractice insurance crisis.' Between 1960 and 1970, insurance rates for
physicians increased dramatically. Rates for non-surgical physicians increased an average of 540.8%, while the rates for surgical physicians increased an astounding 949.2%.2 As a result, physicians began an exodus
from high risk specialty practices or relocated in geographic areas with
lower malpractice rates.3 State legislatures across the nation became concerned about the potential impact of the crisis on health care delivery and
moved to counteract the problem. The legislatures experimented with numerous reforms, including:
(1) limiting either the amount of recovery by plaintiffs or the liability of individual health care providers; (2) reducing the statute of
limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions; (3) abrogating
the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions; (4) establishing medico-legal screening panel plans; and (5) establishing
either compulsory or voluntary arbitration plans.'
All the reforms were controversial at inception, but none more so than the
limiting of a plaintiff's ability to recover damages.' That limitation has
been challenged most often on constitutional grounds, as denying equal protection and due process of law.6
On June 12, 1986, the Wisconsin legislature's study of noneconomic
damages reached fruition with the enactment of Assembly Bill 4.? The bill
1. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 97

(1985) (identifying 1974 as the year the crisis broke).
2. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759, 759 (1977).
3. Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid
Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard IndividualLiberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 144 (1981).

4. Redish, supra note 2, at 761.
5. Comment, Medical Malpractice: ConstitutionalImplications of a Cap on Damages, 7 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 61, 62 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier:ConstitutionalAttacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 35 DEF. L.J. 359 (1986).

7. Assembly Bill 4 was published as 1985 Wisconsin Act 340. 1985 Wis. Laws 1497.
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created two new statutory provisions which are currently controlling on the
question of noneconomic damages in Wisconsin.8
Section 655.017 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that for actions filed
after June 14, 1986, the amount of noneconomic damages recoverable
against a "health care provider" 9 is subject to section 893.55(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes. 1 ° Section 893.55(4) establishes the general framework of
Wisconsin's noneconomic damage limitation. Subsection (a) defines the
scope of the term "noneconomic damages," which is intended to be quite

8. Id. at 1498.
9. "Health care provider" is a statutory term of art defined in Wis. STAT. § 655.001(8). That
statute reads in pertinent part:
(8) "Health care provider" means a medical or osteopathic physician licensed under ch.
448; a nurse anesthetist licensed under ch. 441; a partnership comprised of such physicians
or nurse anesthetists; a corporation organized and operated in this state for the purposes of
providing the medical services of physicians or nurse anesthetists; an operational cooperative sickness care plan organized under §§ 185.981 to 185.985 which directly provides
services through salaried employes in its own facility; an ambulatory surgery center; a
hospital as defined by § 50.33(2)(a) and (c) and any entity operated in this state in connection with one or more hospitals and owned or controlled by the hospital or hospitals when
the entity is assisting the hospital or hospitals in providing diagnosis or treatment of, or
care for, patients of the hospital or hospitals; or a nursing home as defined by § 50.01(3)
whose operations are combined as a single entity with a hospital subject to this section,
whether or not the nursing home operations are physically separate from hospital operations. It excludes any state, county or municipal employe or federal employe covered
under the federal tort claims act, as amended, who is acting within the scope of employment, and any facility exempted by § 50.39(3) or operated by any governmental agency,
but any state, county or municipal employe or facility so excluded who would otherwise be
included in this definition may petition in writing to be afforded the coverage provided by
this chapter and upon filing the petition with the commissioner and paying the fee required
under § 655.27(3) will be subject to this chapter.
WIs. STAT. § 655.001(8) (1987-88). As is clear from a reading of the statute, the definition includes some entities which might not be included in the layperson's definition of "health care
provider." It is arguably the case that most laypersons think of human beings (such as a "physician") rather than entities (such as an "operational cooperative sickness care plan") as providing
health care.
Conversely, the statute excludes some persons who might ordinarily be thought of as health
care providers. Excluded persons would include dentists, optometrists, chiropractors, podiatrists
(originally included but expressly deleted by 1985 Wis. Act 340 (1986)), psychologists, nurses and
physical therapists.
10. WIs. STAT. § 655.017 (1987-88). The section provides:
The amount of noneconomic damages recoverable by a claimant or plaintiff under this
chapter for acts or omissions of a health care provider if the action is filed on or after June
14, 1986 and before January 1, 1991, ... is subject to the limit under section 893.55(4).

Id.
The legislature is experimenting with the noneconomic damage limitation on a five year trial
basis; the statute creates a "sunset" date of January 1, 1991. See Saichek, A Summary of the New
Statutes Governing Medical Malpractice, 59 Wis. B. BULL. 8, 10 (Oct. 1986).
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broad.11 Subsection (b) makes clear that the statute includes actions against
all "health care providers" within its limit. 2
Subsection (c) explains how the limitation effects verdicts. 13 If there is a
bench trial, the court makes findings as to actual noneconomic damages and
then, if necessary, reduces them to the statutory limit. For a jury trial, the
statute seems to require the jury to make the award without regard to the
limit and then also reduce the damages if greater than the limit.14
11. Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(a) (1987-88). The subsection reads in full:
(4)(a) In this subsection, "noneconomic damages" means moneys intended to compensate
for pain and suffering; humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress; noneconomic
effects of disability including loss of enjoyment of the normal activities, benefits and
pleasures of life and loss of mental or physical health, well-being or bodily functions; loss
of consortium, society and companionship; or loss of love and affection.
Id.
This definition is based on Wisconsin J.I.- Civil 1750A, subdivisions 5, 5A (1982). However,
the drafters also added loss of consortium, society and companionship, love and affection to the
definition. See Saichek, supra note 10, at 10.
12. Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(b) (1987-88). The subsection provides:
(b) The total noneconomic damages recoverable under ch. 655 for bodily injury or death,
including any action or proceeding based on contribution or indemnification, may not exceed the limit under par. (d) for each occurrence from all health care providers... acting
within the scope of their employment and providing health care services who are found
negligent and from the patients compensation fund for any action filed on or after June 14,
1986 and before January 1, 1991.
Id.
13. Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(c) (1987-88). The subsection provides:
(c) A court in an action tried without a jury shall make a finding as to noneconomic
damages without regard to the limit under par. (d). If noneconomic damages in excess of
the limit are found, the court shall make any reduction required under § 895.045 and shall
award as noneconomic damages the lesser of the reduced amount or the limit. If an action
is before a jury, the jury shall make a finding as to noneconomic damages without regard to
the limit under par. (d). If the jury finds that noneconomic damages exceed the limit, the
jury shall make any reduction required under § 895.045 and the court shall award as
noneconomic damages the lesser of the reduced amount or the limit.
Id.
14. One commentator has criticized the legislature's choice of language on this point. "Procedurally, the jury makes no 'reduction,' but only findings. The jury will find damages and the
percentage of causal negligence. The court will do the rest." Saichek, supra note 10, at 10.
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Subsection (d) is the damage limitation provision. 5 It provides that the
total noneconomic damages recoverable for any one occurrence is one million dollars, adjusted to the consumer price index. 6
This Comment takes the position that Wisconsin's noneconomic damage limitation would be upheld against a constitutional challenge. In Sections I and II, this Comment explains the constitutional background
regarding damage cap challenges, and analyzes the success of equal protection and due process challenges in other states. Section III applies these
standards to the Wisconsin limitation on noneconomic damages, and discusses the probable outcome. Section IV argues that a challenge to the Wisconsin noneconomic damage cap could only succeed by persuading the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to expand the scope of intermediate scrutiny
under the state constitution. Finally, this Comment reaches the conclusion
that the noneconomic damage limitation is likely to withstand such a challenge because of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's refusal to expand state
constitution intermediate scrutiny.
I.

EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

The equal protection clause 7 of the United States Constitution guarantees that all persons will be dealt with in a similar manner by-the government.' 8 Traditionally, equal protection claims have been analyzed by the
United States Supreme Court using a two-tier analysis consistihg of the
15. WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d) (1987-8). The section provides:
(d) The limit on total noneconomic damages for each occurrence under par. (b) shall be
$1,000,000 for actions filed on or after June 14, 1986, and shall be adjusted by the director
of state courts to reflect changes in the consumer price index for all urban customers, U.S.
city average, as determined by the U.S. department of labor, at least annually thereafter,
with the adjusted limit to apply to awards subsequent to such adjustments.
Id.
16. Id. Assembly Bill 4 introduced the $1,000,000 limitation. However, other figures were
introduced in amendment form. Assembly amendment 4 to Assembly Bill 4 would have substituted a $250,000 limitation. It was rejected 71-28. Similarly, assembly amendment I to assembly
amendment 4 would have substituted a $500,000 limitation. This amendment was withdrawn
before a vote could be taken. Legislative History of Assembly Bill 4 (microfiche 1, 1985 Wis. Act

340).
17. The equal protection clause reads in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The equal protection clause, by its very terms, bears only on the conduct of the states. Note,
Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1969). However, a
classification by the federal government which would violate the equal protection clause violates
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.1, at 524 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
18. NOWAK, supra note 17, § 14.2, at 525.
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"strict scrutiny" standard and the "rational basis" test. 19 However, a third
test, the "intermediate scrutiny" standard,2" has now been recognized.2 1
Each standard will be discussed in turn, along with cases which illustrate
how the standard has been applied in the medical malpractice context.
A.

Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny is the most rigorous standard currently in use.22 Under
this standard, a court "independently determine[s] the degree of relationship which the classification bears to a constitutionally compelling end,"
rather than deferring to the decision of the political branches.23
Application of the strict scrutiny analysis necessitates a two step process. First, a court determines whether the legislation creates a suspect
classification or interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right. According to the United States Supreme Court, a classification is suspect when the
"class is... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
19. Smith, supra note 6, at 367; see also Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate"Equal
Protection Decisions:Five Imperfect Models of ConstitutionalEquality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
777, 777 (1981); Note, California'sMedicalInjury CompensationReform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 859 (1979) [hereinafter CaliforniaEqual Protection Challenge]; Note, Which EqualProtection Standardfor MedicalMalpracticeLegislation?,8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 125, 132 (1980) [hereinafter Which Equal Protection Standard].
Analysis under the two-tier system has been criticized as overly rigid:
[T]he lenient "rational basis" scrutiny applied to most statutes almost never results in voidance of the legislation, though the heightened "compelling state interest" scrutiny [strict
scrutiny] almost invariably will. It is rigid because in theory it permits only two widely
variant levels of scrutiny with no gradations for rights of intermediate importance. It is
deficient because, as Professor Freund once remarked, the word does not move on a "binary principle."
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 948 n.15 (1975).
20. This test has also been variously called: "minimal-rationality-with-bite" approach, Panel
Discussion with J. Choper, R. Forrester, G. Gunther, and P. Kirkland, March 22, 1975 printedin
Forum:Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 645, 659 (1975); "substantial relationship test", Smith, supra note 6, at 370; "middle-tier scrutiny", Note, Refining the
Methods of Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New Proposalfor Equal Protection, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1501
(1983) [hereinafter Refining Middle-Tier Scrutiny].
21. Professors Nowak, Rotunda and Young credit Professor Gerald Gunther's article
Foreward:In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt:A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV, L. REV. 1 (1972), with first recognizing that the Court did not always apply the
traditional two-tier scrutiny. NOWAK, supra note 17, § 14.3, at 531 n.13.
22. CaliforniaEqual Protection Challenge,supra note 19, at 860.
23. NOWAK, supra note 17, § 14.3, at 530; see also Hawkins v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602, 613 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Horton v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 339, 343 (W.D.
Va. 1979).
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majoritarian political process."' 24 The Supreme Court has held few classifi25
cations to be suspect. These classifications have been based upon race,
national origin,2 6 and alienage. 27 The Supreme Court describes fundamental rights as those which have their origin explicitly or implicitly in the
Constitution.2 8 Rights rising to the level of "fundamental" have also been
limited.2 9
If a court finds a suspect classification or interference with a fundamental right, a court next examines whether the legislation is "precisely tailored
to serve a compelling... [state] interest."' 30 While a court nominally examines the nexus between the classification and the state interest, its scrutiny is
in reality more rigorous. As Professor Gunther has noted, while this scrutiny is strict in theory, it is usually fatal in fact.3 1
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in White v. State32 is one of
very few which applied a strict scrutiny standard to a limitation on damages. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the state was grossly negligent
in allowing a violent mental hospital patient to escape. The patient attacked Ms. White and she allegedly sustained severe emotional harm,
though no demonstrable economic losses.33 The state based its defense
upon a provision of the Montana Code which limited governmental liability
in tort. It gave the state immunity from noneconomic damages and limited

24. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
25. See, eg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
26. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
644-46 (1948). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
27. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22
(1973); Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-43 (1915).
28. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982); San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
29. Those rights which have been held to be fundamental include: freedom of association,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958);
marriage,Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978); privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154-64 (1973); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969); and voting, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
30. Plyler,457 U.S. at 217; see also Bice, Standards of JudicialReview Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 694-95 (1977); Which Equal Protection
Standard, supra note 19, at 133.
31. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Gunther, supra
note 21, at 8).
The Court has explicitly recognized the rigor of strict scrutiny. In Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S.
216 (1984), the Court observed that "[o]nly rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny." Id. at 219 n.6.
32. 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
33. Id. at _, 661 P.2d at 1273.
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economic damages to $300,000 for each claimant and $1,000,000 for each
34
occurrence.

White, however, argued that the statute violated the principles of equal
protection by classifying plaintiffs in three unconstitutional ways:
1. It classifies victims of negligence who have sustained noneconomic damage by whether they have been injured by a
nongovernment tort-feasor or a government tort-feasor. It totally
denies any recovery to the latter class.
2. It classifies victims of government tort-feasors by whether they
have suffered economic damages or noneconomic damages. It allows recovery to the former group up to $300,000 while it totally
denies recovery to the latter group.
3. It classifies victims of government tort-feasors by the severity of
the victims' injuries. It grants recovery to those victims who have
not sustained significant injury by allowing them to recover up to
$300,000 in economic damages. It discriminates against the seriously injured
victims by denying recovery for any injuries over
35
$300,000.

The court agreed. Its analysis proceeded under article II, section 16 of the
Montana Constitution 36 and found the right to bring suit for all personal
injury damages to be a fundamental right under the state constitution.3 7
Therefore, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard and refused to give
any deference to the Montana Legislature's statutory enactment. "Application of this test requires that the statutory scheme be found unconstitutional
34. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 1274. The statute providing immunity was former MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-9-104(l) (repealed ch. 675, L. 1983).
35. Id. at

-,

661 P.2d at 1274.

36. Article II, § 16 reads in pertinent part: "Courts of justice shall be open to every person,
and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character." MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 16 (1987).
37. White, 203 Mont. at _, 661 P.2d at 1275. A number of commentators have advocated
expansion of state constitutional rights beyond those found in the federal constitution. See, e.g.,
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873 (1976); Linde, First Things First:Rediscoveringthe States' Bills ofRights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379 (1980); Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoningand Result, 35 S.C.L. REV. 353 (1984); Comment, Developments in the
Law - The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
For an interesting but somewhat unusual analysis, see Morgan, FundamentalState Rights: A
New Basisfor Strict Scrutiny in FederalEqual ProtectionReview, 17 GA. L. REV. 77 (1984) (advocating that fundamental rights under federal equal protection should be expanded to include fundamental state rights; under this approach, the Supreme Court would defer to the states'
designation of certain rights as fundamental).
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unless the State can demonstrate that such law is necessary 'to promote a
compelling government interest.' ,3
The application of the strict scrutiny standard made the court's decision
a foregone conclusion; the statute was struck down in its entirety. The
court was persuaded to apply strict scrutiny by language in its constitution
to the effect that there must be a speedy remedy for "every injury."'3 9 A
limitation, the court held, which differentiates between plaintiffs who seek
recompense for pain and suffering and those whose damages are economic
in nature is discriminatory.' No merit was found in the State's counterargument that it had a compelling state interest in "insuring that sufficient
public funds will be available to enable the State and local governments to
provide those services which they believe benefit their citizens and their
citizens demand.

41

White v. State illustrates the power of a state supreme court to expand
fundamental rights under the state constitution if it so wishes. State
supreme courts, as the interpreters of their respective constitutions, clearly
have the power to engage in such expansion. 42 However, as will be discussed below, few state supreme courts have chosen to exercise their power
to strike down legislative damage caps in order to expand fundamental
rights to include the right to recover the full damages awarded by the
jury.4 3 More often, a state high court will defer to the findings of the legislature by analyzing the damage cap under the rational basis standard.
B.

Rational Basis

In cases in which no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, a statute is scrutinized under the rational basis test.44 If a court
chooses to apply this test, the legislation need only bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.4 5 This standard is an extremely def38. White, 203 Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 1274 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 341
(1972)).
39. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 1275. "The language 'every injury' embraces all recognized compensable components of injury, including the right to be compensated for physical pain and
mental anguish and the loss of enjoyment of living. Therefore, strict scrutiny attaches." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. While the court recognized that the "government has a valid interest in protecting its
treasury," the court found that "payment of tort judgments is simply a cost of doing business."
Id. Further, the court found no evidence that the payment of civil claims was impairing the
functioning of the government or causing any financial crisis. Id.

42. See generally supra note 37 and articles cited therein.
43. See infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
44. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1985).
45. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982). In Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981), the Court explained the test:
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erential one,4 6 and leaves the correctness of the legislative judgment entirely
up to the legislature.4 7 The two cases discussed below are classic examples
of the application of the rational basis standard. Each court clearly evidences in its opinion great deference for legislatively enacted solutions to

the medical malpractice crisis.
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors,4 the plaintiff suffered severe side-effects from anti-psychotic drugs administered at Louisiana State University
Medical Center. She suffered cardiopulmonary arrest as a result of the incident.4 9 The plaintiff sought damages in excess of the Louisiana $500,000
limit on state liability for medical malpractice damages and, therefore, challenged its constitutionality. 50
In determining whether a challenged classification is rationally related to achievement of a
legitimate state purpose, we must answer two questions: (1) Does the challenged legislation
have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the law makers to believe that use
of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?

Id. at 668.
46. Professor Gunther observes that "the 'mere rationality' requirement symbolize[s] virtual
judicial abdication" by the Court to the legislative branches. Gunther, supra note 21, at 19.
47. "States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgements. Rather, 'those challenging the legislative judgement must convince the court that the legislative facts on which classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be
true by the governmental decisionmaker.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 464 (1981) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1978)).
A court is not to weigh conflicting evidence as to whether an act will succeed in effectuating
the legislature's stated goals. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464-66. Also, social and economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights
"carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of
arbitrariness and irrationality." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981). The Court is even
willing to create fact situations to uphold a statute under the rational basis test. "State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any statement of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S, 420,
426 (1961).
48. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
49. Id. at 151.
50. Id. at 152. The relevant state statute is LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39 (West 1977),
which reads in pertinent part:
B. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law to the contrary, any health care provided [sic] ("person" as defined herein) acting within the course and scope of his employment, health care facility staff appointment or assignment for or on behalf of the state to
any health care institution whether or not he receives compensation for such services, shall
not be held liable for any amount of damages in excess of five hundred thousand dollars
plus interests and costs for any injury or death of the patient due to any alleged act of
malpractice within the course and scope of such employment, staff appointment, or assignment. The state shall pay any costs of legal defense and damages awarded by judgment of
a court or by a compromise after institution of a suit for a medical malpractice claim or
claims against such health care provider ("person" as defined herein) not to exceed five
hundred thousand dollars plus interests and costs.
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The plaintiff argued to the Louisiana Supreme Court that the statute
created discriminatory classifications in contravention of equal protection.
First, the plaintiff alleged that doctors as a class received preferential treatment, since the statute relieved them of a substantial portion of their liability exposure. Second, the plaintiff alleged that the statute denied full
recovery to any indigent plaintiff who used state-provided health care services. 5 The court, however, found these arguments unpersuasive.
The court recited that equal protection requires strict scrutiny only
where a suspect classification is created or a fundamental right is infringed.
The court found suspect classifications to include the traditional classifications and left open the possibility of others to be considered on a case-bycase basis.5 2 However, without further discussion, the court held that this
statute "[o]bviously ... does not involve a classification prohibited by equal
protection considerations." 5 3 Similarly, the court found no infringement on
fundamental rights since one of the traditional, federal fundamental rights
was not implicated. 4 The court summarily rejected intermediate scrutiny
as inapposite, and applied the rational basis analysis.5 Therefore, the court
adopted an appropriately deferential stance towards the malpractice
legislation:
[T]he legislative process is a difficult task and legislative solutions
will be accorded great latitude and deference by the judiciary when
dealing with an equal protection assessment. Assuming a legitimate
state objective (and assuring the continued availability of quality
health care is surely legitimate), the question is not "[w]hether in
fact the Act will promote (the legislature's objective) [but] the Equal

Id. at § 40:1299.39A.(6)(B).
51. Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 154.
52. Id. at 155. The court first noted that traditionally "[c]lassifications based on race, religion
or political beliefs are, of course, absolutely prohibited." Id. However, the court remained open to
considering the impact of other classifications. "[O]ther classifications are tested on a less rigorous basis, depending on the character of the classification involved and the strength of the state
interest supporting the distinction." Id. The court did not further define or discuss these possible
"other classifications."
53. Id.
54. Id. The court cited only United States Supreme Court cases to support this holding,
which implies reliance on the fundamental rights of the federal equal protection clause, or analogously, that the court considered the fundamental rights of the Louisiana equal protection clause
to be coextensive with its federal counterpart. The stated fundamental rights were "freedom of
expression and association"; the "right to vote and participate in the electoral process"; the "right
to interstate travel"; the "right to fairness in the criminal process"; the "right to fairness in procedures concerning governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property"; and, the "right to privacy." Id.
55. Id. at 156.
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Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusions that the legislature
could rationally have decided that (it) ...might ...."
The court found that the statute did not violate equal protection.
A similarly deferential attitude was taken by the California Supreme
Court in Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group. 7 In that case, Fein sued the
Permanente Medical Group for failure to diagnose an impending heart attack despite clear symptoms. 5 8 The jury awarded $500,000 in noneconomic
damages, but the trial court reduced the amount to $250,000 pursuant to
California's statutory limit on those damages. 9
Fein alleged that the cap on noneconomic damages discriminated between both medical malpractice and other tort plaintiffs, and between those
malpractice plaintiffs with noneconomic damages greater than $250,000
and those with less damage.6" As in Sibley, the court in Fein applied the
deferential standard and found the limitation on noneconomic damages was
a rational response to the "insurance 'crisis'" in the state.6" In upholding
56. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
57. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
58. Id. at 143-44, 695 P.2d at 669-70, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73. The plaintiff's expert witness
testified that Fein's life expectancy was reduced by half, rather than by the ten to fifteen percent
that would have been the case had the condition been properly treated. Id. at 145, 695 P.2d at
670, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
59. Id. at 145-46, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The applicable section of the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) is codified as California Civil Code
§ 3333.2 and reads in relevant part: "(a) In any [medical malpractice] action . . .the injured
plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage. (b) In no action
shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($250,000)." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1989).
60. Id. at 161-62, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
61. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385. In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird, while
recognizing the preservation of insurance as a legitimate objective, found the legislation as enacted
to be an arbitrary and unreasonable solution. "There is no logically supportable reason why the
most severely injured malpractice victims should be singled out to pay for special relief to medical
tortfeasors and their insurers." Id. at 173, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.J.,
disssenting). She would rather have seen relief to health care providers spread among a larger
class of beneficiaries, such as health care consumers or taxpayers. "Millions of health care consumers stand to gain from whatever savings the limit produces. Yet, the entire burden of paying
for this benefit is concentrated on a handful of badly injured victims - fewer than 15 in the year
MICRA was enacted." Id. at 175, 695 P.2d at 692, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395. Justice Mosk, dissenting separately, advocated the use of the intermediate scrutiny standard rather than the rational
basis standard. Id. at 179, 695 P.2d at 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
In the case of Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985), a federal court of
appeals also upheld California Civil Code § 3333.2 in the face of a federal equal protection challenge. The court applied the rational basis standard, it said, because "malpractice victims with
noneconomic losses that exceed $250,000 do not constitute a suspect class and the right to recovery of tort damages is not a fundamental right ....
" Id. at 1435. The court rejected Hoffman's
argument that there was not a sufficient nexus between the statute and the legislative goal of
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the cap on noneconomic damages, the court dismissed the plaintiff's equal
protection argument with little discussion.6 2 The court first dismissed the
argument that a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages is more invidious
than a complete elimination of noneconomic damages from an equal protection standpoint. The court remarked: "Just as the complete elimination of
a cause of action has never been viewed as invidiously discriminating within
the class of victims who have lost the right to sue, the $250,000 limit which applies to all malpractice victims - does not amount to an unconstitutional discrimination." 6 3
The Fein court also rejected the contention that the $250,000 limit is
unconstitutional because the same results could have been obtained by a
fixed percentage reduction on noneconomic awards. The court held the
choice between reasonable alternatives was for the legislature, and "there
are a number of reasons why the Legislature may have made the choice it
did."' Thus, as is not unusual for a court applying the deferential standard, the Fein court was willing to take the findings of the legislature and
create rational bases for the legislative enactment. The court noted the leg-

reducing premiums. The court relied on the fact that there was a "reasonably conceivable statement of facts which would justify the classification." Id. at 1437 n.7; see also Fetter v. United
States, 649 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (application of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 under Federal Tort Claims Act upheld).
62. "[T]he Legislature clearly had a reasonable basis for drawing a distinction between economic and noneconomic damages." Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
386.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 162-63, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386. It is interesting to note that while
the California Supreme Court applied the rational basis standard in examining the legislature's
solution to the malpractice crisis, they were not explicit as to which equal protection clause, state
or federal, they were proceeding under. This is a minor point where the state supreme court
considers the state constitution to be coextensive with its federal counterpart. However, an explicit indication by the court as to choice of constitution makes analysis of the opinion simpler.
Compare, Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (federal appeals court judge first
upheld reduction of damage award against federal equal protection challenge then certified to the
Texas Supreme Court the question of whether the Texas damage statute denied equal protection
under the Texas Constitution) and Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, 158 (La. 1985)
(upholding statute against equal protection challenge under both state and federal constitutions)
with Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 161-64, 695 P.2d at 682-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87 (court was not
explicit whether grounds for upholding statute was state or federal equal protection clauses);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, _, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668 (1977) (plurality opinion) (equal
protection challenges rejected under both state and federal constitutions) and Duren v. Suburban
Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 495 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio Com. P1. 1985) ("This court holds
[the medical malpractice limitation on general damages] violates the protection of both the Ohio
and federal Constitutions beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at -, 495 N.E.2d at 56. However, in
Duren there is no indication as to whether the statute was unconstitutional on an equal protection
basis, due process basis, or both. In addition, there is no real indication what state or federal
constitutional standards were applied in striking the statute down).
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islature's finding that as a result of "the inherent difficulties involving such
damages" the size of noneconomic damage awards was unpredictable.6"
From this finding the court posited that it would be reasonable for the legislature to determine that an across-the-board limit might stabilize insurance
rates. The court also stated that the legislature might have determined the
cap would promote settlement by reducing the reward for gambling on a
large pain and suffering award by the jury.66
C. Intermediate Scrutiny
At the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court to some degree moved away
from the use of the rigid two-tier analysis to the occasional use of an intermediate scrutiny standard.67 For classifications involving gender,68 indigency,69 and illegitimacy,7" the Court heightened its scrutiny. For these
cases the Court declared that the classification "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'" Put another way, there must
be a substantial relationship between the means and ends of the legislation.72 Three cases are presented to demonstrate the correct and internally
coherent use of the intermediate scrutiny standard. The fourth and final
case indicates the pitfalls courts may encounter if federal equal protection
standards are not isolated from state equal protection standards.
65. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 162-63, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
66. Id.
67. One commentator identifies the birth year of the intermediate scrutiny test as 1968. In
that year the Supreme Court decided Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), a case in which the
Court ostensibly applied the rational basis standard to strike down legislation which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother. Refining Middle-Tier
Scrutiny, supra note 20, at 1501. The standard in Levy had to have been more strict than the

rational basis test, for as another commentator observed, "the Warren Court's announcement...
[that the rational basis] test was to be applied was tantamount to an announcement of the constitutionality of the legislation." See Bice, supra note 30, at 698.
68. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
69. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
70. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
71. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
72. [A] court employing the means scrutiny standard appraises more carefully the factual
assumptions that underlie the asserted connection between legislative means and ends....
Under this test, the courts presumably would not question the asserted legislative goal of
ameliorating the crisis in medical malpractice, but would inquire whether a crisis does in
fact exist and whether the legislation in question substantially alleviates that crisis.
Redish, supra note 2, at 772-73.
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In Arneson v. Olson,73 the North Dakota Supreme Court struck down a
$300,000 limitation on total damages as violative of the equal protection
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 74 The court explained its standard of review as "whether there is a sufficiently close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals so as not to violate equal
protection requirements of the State and Federal Constitutions. '75 The
court then proceeded to examine the record before it for evidence of the
necessary nexus. The record indicated that North Dakota had a much
lower incidence of malpractice claims than other states, and that insurance
premiums were the sixth lowest in the nation. 76 Based on these findings,
the court held that the limitation on damages did not promote the legislative goal of keeping malpractice insurance premiums down.77 It seems clear
that the level of scrutiny was greater than rational, since the court did not
defer to the wishes of the legislature.
In Jones v. State Board of Medicine,7" the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected the rational basis standard on the ground that the state's malpractice
statute created a "discriminatory classification" in violation of the state's
equal protection clause. 79 The court applied the intermediate scrutiny test
and found the statute would be discriminatory against those with damages
in excess of the statutory limitation of $150,000.8" However, the court was
hesitant, on the facts before it, to strike the statute down until it was able to
ascertain the nexus between the statutory means and legislature's ends.8 '

73. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-01 (1978).
75. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135. Though the court did not say so explicitly, they used the

intermediate scrutiny standard.
76. Id. at 136.

77. Id. at 135.
78. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
79. The court seemed concerned that adoption of the rational basis test would cause the court
to neglect its responsibilities in this instance:
When the [rational basis] test . . .has been utilized, the result has ordinarily been the
removal of the court from any but the most cursory review of the challenged legislation. It
invites courts to conceive purposes which would justify statutes. The validity or invalidity
of discriminatory classifications may under that test depend solely upon the extent of the
imagination of the reviewing court and/or its adherence to the theory of judicial restraint
[,]
....
While we recognize and agree with the concept of judicial restraint [,]
... nevertheless, blind adherence and over-indulgence results in abdication ofjudicial responsibility.
Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 411 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 410.
81. "[T]he record here presents no factual basis for understanding the nature and scope of the
alleged medical malpractice crisis nationally or in Idaho. It is thus impossible for this Court to
assess the necessity for this legislation." Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 413.
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Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for presentation of addi2
tional evidence and findings.1
In Carson v. Maurer,3 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire also applied the intermediate scrutiny standard when it addressed the constitutionality of the state's limit on noneconomic damages under the state's equal
protection clause. 4 In doing so, the court noted that the federal courts
used this standard only for gender and illegitimacy cases. However, the
court observed that it was "free to grant individuals more rights than the
Federal Constitution requires," 5 and was similarly free to use the intermediate test to scrutinize other classifications when examining the state constitution.8 6 Applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the court found the
87
relationship between statutory means and legislative ends to be "weak."
The court next turned to the argument that the statute was saved by
limiting only noneconomic damages, rather than total damages. The court
said a victim "gains" nothing from receiving economic damages;
the only
88
compensation for pain and suffering is noneconomic damages.
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.89 is a good illustration of the
problems state courts may have in applying the federal equal protection
standard to state law. In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld a
$500,000 statutory limitation on total damages in the face of the intermediate scrutiny test. The court found a "fair and substantial" relationship between the statutory limitation imposed by the Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act and the classification of injured patients because the Act guaranteed
recovery of up to $500,000.90 The court stated that this was a substantial
benefit in light of the fact that the "probability that a wrongfully injured
patient would in fact collect more than $500,000 in damages [from the insurance or personal assets of a health care provider] would be very small."9

82. Id. at _, 555 P.2d at 416.
83. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

84. Id. at, 424 A.2d at 831. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 11 (1983) placed a $250,000
limit on noneconomic damages.
85. Carson, 120 N.H. at _, 424 A.2d at 831.
86. Id.
87. Id. at-, 424 A.2d at 836. The court considered the two weaknesses to be "'[tjirst, paidout damage awards constitute only a small part of total insurance premium costs. Second, and of
primary importance, few individuals suffer noneconomic damages in excess of $250,000." Id.
(quoting CaliforniaEqual Protection Challenge, supra note 19, at 951).
88. Carson, 120 N.H. at _, 424 A.2d at 837.
89. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
90. Id. at _, 404 N.E.2d at 601; IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums 1983).
91. Johnson, 273 Ind. at -, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
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Theoretical problems exist in the court's use of the intermediate scrutiny test. The court was applying the equal protection standards of the federal constitution. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to extend its use of
the intermediate scrutiny test to any classifications other than gender, indigency and illegitimacy.9 2 The court could have reached the same result
while staying theoretically consistent by applying the rational basis test of
the state or federal constitutions or, alternatively, applying the state intermediate standard to the constitution. Under the rational basis test, the
court would merely defer to the judgment of the legislature. Under the
state intermediate scrutiny test, it would be within the court's power to
expand intermediate scrutiny to reach the state malpractice statute, because
93
the state's highest court is the final arbiter of the state constitution.
II.
A.

THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND QUID
PRO Quo CHALLENGES

Substantive Due Process/QuidPro Quo Standards

Due process has two components, a procedural component and a substantive component. While the procedural component is discussed occasionally in the context of medical malpractice statutes, 94 the substantive
portion of due process is more frequently litigated, along with its counterpart the "quid pro quo." This Comment limits its analysis to this more
commonly encountered issue.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that a
state may not deprive any citizen of "life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." 9 5 Limitations on damages circumscribe a jury's ability to
compensate a plaintiff as it sees fit. Thus, the argument exists that a statutory limitation on damages deprives a plaintiff of some of his or her "property" - the common law right to receive whatever the jury awards. 96
Since 1937 the Supreme Court has utilized a two-tier scrutiny similar to
traditional equal protection scrutiny when applying the substantive due
92. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 37 and authorities cited therein.
94. The fourteenth amendment due process clause reads in pertinent part: "No State shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Before a person is deprived of life, liberty or property, he or she must be
accorded "that process which is due"; that is, a fair hearing or other procedure. See Bice, supra

note 30, at 711.
95. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.

96. Common law jury awards are subject to reduction as well. See, e.g., Wis.
§ 805.15(6) (1985-86).

STAT.
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process theory.9 7 The first tier adopts a deferential stance toward economic
and social legislation. Legislation of this type is "presumptively constitutional and will be sustained if not wholly arbitrary or capricious." 9 8 On the
other hand, where legislation impinges on fundamental rights or restricts
political processes, "the state must prove a compelling reason to justify the
legislation." 99
In conjunction with the substantive due process analysis, the courts
often address the need for a reasonable substitute, or quid pro quo, for any
legislative limitation or abrogation of a preexisting common law right."°
The Supreme Court has never decided the question of whether a quid pro
quo is necessary to abrogate a common law remedy.1 0 1 Although many
other courts have addressed the issue, their holdings have varied widely.
B.

Substantive Due Process/QuidPro Quo Decisions

Most, if not all, courts consider the deferential standard the one to apply
when examining medical malpractice statutes under a substantive due process analysis. In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, °2 Louisiana's $500,000 limitation on state tort liability was at issue. 103 The court made it clear that it
considered the limitation to be economic, social-type legislation meriting
great deference. The court held the standard for examining such legislation
should be whether "the regulation is reasonable in relation to the goal
sought to be attained and is adopted in the interest of the community as a
whole."'" The court's rationale for applying this standard was that it was
not its place to "second-guess the legislators in their heavy responsibility."' 0 5 The court upheld the statute.
97. While the 1934 case of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), indicated a possible
shift away from substantive due process, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
marked the beginning of the end for serious judicial scrutiny of the ends of the legislature. In
West Coast Hotel, the Court upheld a state minimum wage law for women. In the process, the
Court also overruled a case decided at the high point of substantive due process, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which the Court had struck down a similar minimum wage
for women. See NOWAK, supra note 17, § 11.4, at 353.
98. Smith, supra note 6, at 378; see also Redish, supra note 2, at 784.
99. Smith, supra note 6, at 378 (footnote omitted).
100. Redish, supra note 2, at 785. Although Professor Redish noted that some courts have
held that due process requires a quid pro quo before the legislature may limit or extinguish a
common law right, he found the origin of the doctrine "dubious." Id.
101. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 786 (W.D. Va. 1986) (stating that the Supreme
Court has never decided whether a quid pro quo is necessary).
102. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
103. Id. at 157. For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 157.
105. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:235

A similar rationale was given by the California Supreme Court in upholding that state's $250,000 limitation on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions. In Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group,"°6 the court
observed that a plaintiff had "no vested property right in a particular measure of damages," ' 7 and that the legislature has broad powers to modify
common law remedies. 0 8 Because of the legislature's broad powers in this
area, the court held that it was not for the judicial authorities to pass judgment on the wisdom of the legislation.'° 9
In conjunction with the substantive due process analysis, there typically
is some discussion of whether a quid pro quo is necessary if the legislature
limits the plaintiff's right to receive the full complement of damages the
jury awards. On one level of analysis, the courts often refuse to find a quid
pro quo necessary before the legislature may limit the common law right to
damages. " ° A possible rationale for the refusal to find a quid pro quo required would be a hesitancy to create a precedent which might haunt a
court every time it addressed a legislative limitation of a common law right.
In addition to this hesitancy to create precedent, a second, and perhaps
more persuasive reason why courts have refused to find a quid pro quo
necessary is that the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly made
such a finding.1 1' In Jones v. State Board of Medicine," 2 the Supreme
Court of Idaho considered whether a quid pro quo was necessary to uphold

106. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
107. Id. at 157, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (quoting American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 368-69, 683 P.2d 670, 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677 (1984)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 158, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The court found it significant that the

legislature limited only noneconomic damages, leaving the plaintiff free to recover unlimited economic damages. The court noted that some commentators had expressed doubt as to the wisdom
of awarding such noneconomic damages, as well as questioning the ability of money to adequately
compensate for noneconomic injuries. Thus the court concluded:
Faced with the prospect that, in the absence of some cost reduction, medical malpractice
plaintiffs might as a realistic matter have difficulty collecting judgments for any of their
damages - pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary - the Legislature concluded that it was in
the public interest to attempt to obtain some cost savings by limiting noneconomic
damages.

Id. at 160, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
110. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, __,555 P.2d 399, 409 (1976);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, -, 256 N.W.2d 657, 671 (1977) (plurality opinion); State ex
rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 519-20, 261 N.W.2d 434, 447-48 (1978).
111. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (expressing doubt that a quid pro quo was required, but not specifically holding); see also Boyd v. Bulala,
647 F. Supp. 781, 786 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court has never clearly
established the need for a quid pro quo).
112. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
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Idaho's $300,000 limitation on damages." 3 The court indicated that it had
serious reservations as to the need for a quid pro quo, since the doctrine
stemmed from dicta." 4 The Idaho court also observed that other courts
have questioned whether a quid pro quo was required. 1 5 It was the court's
opinion that the United States Supreme Court "did not intend to engraft
upon the traditional due process test an additional standard when the challenged statute involves alteration of some prior existing common law doctrine."" 6 Accordingly, the Idaho court refused to find a quid pro quo
necessary.
Although most courts agree that a quid pro quo is not necessary, on a
secondary level of analysis there is often some discussion as to whether the
damage limitation statute provides a quid pro quo.' 7 The courts disagree
over whether it does. Courts finding a quid pro quo hold the increased
collectibility of the judgment, owing to more widely available malpractice
insurance, to be a reasonable substitute for the limitation on damages
awarded. The rationale for this argument is that it is better to collect some
damages than none at all.
For example, in Prendergastv. Nelson," 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court,
while rejecting the requirement of a quid pro quo, found that a quid pro quo
in fact existed:
In return for relatively minor restrictions on the remedy and the
ceiling of $500,000, the patient receives assurance of collectibiity of
113. Id. at _, 555 P.2d at 408-09.
114. The Jones court identified New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917), as
the origin of the idea that due process requires a quid pro quo. See also Redish, supra note 2, at
785 (also identifying White dicta as the origin of the quid pro quo doctrine).
115. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 409.
116. Id.
117. Discussion of whether there isa quid pro quo, despite the holding that one need not
exist, is due to the uncertainty surrounding this issue about which the Supreme Court has been
less than clear and forthcoming. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), is thought
by some courts and commentators to be the origin of the quid pro quo. However, commentators
such as Professor Redish have criticized the assertion that a quid pro quo doctrine was created in
White. See Redish, supra note 2, at 785-90. As recently as a decade ago, the Supreme Court had a
chance to clarify the issue but declined to do so. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978), the Court held "it is not at all clear that the Due Process
Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy." Id. Despite that holding, the
Court declined to reach whether a quid pro quo was necessary since the law at issue provided a
quid pro quo for the common law remedies it replaced. Id.
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the issue, courts are forced to embody the White considerations into each opinion they write. They are able to say they doubt the right to a quid pro
quo exists; nevertheless, most feel obligated to decide whether a quid pro quo exists in each specific case.
118. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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any judgment recovered.... [T]he collectibility of a judgment is a
matter of considerable value, as demonstrated by the evidence in this
case that the plaintiff Prendergast, except for the new law, would not
be able to acquire any malpractice insurance.1 1 9
A similar rationale is found in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group.'20 The
California Supreme Court rejected the need for a quid pro quo, but felt that
"the preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance industry ...
was ... an adequate benefit for the detriment the legislation imposes on
malpractice plaintiffs."''2
On the other hand, not all courts agree that the damage limitation statute would provide a quid pro quo if one were necessary. This argument
criticizes the fact that the benefit the doctors receive - presumably restricted liability - comes from the plaintiff's award, without any consideration for the seriousness of plaintiff's injury. The district court in Boyd v.
Bulala 122 expressed this sentiment:
[T]here is nothing in the way of a corresponding benefit flowing to
the injured plaintiff. There is no certainty of recovery for the plaintiff, and should he be successful in the effort to recover, he then encounters the restriction of the cap, no matter how serious or
123
debilitating his injuries may be.
III.

Is

WISCONSIN'S NONECONOMIC DAMAGE LIMITATION
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

Wisconsin's noneconomic damage limitation is of recent origin and has
yet to be judicially challenged. 124 However, owing to the frequency with
which such limitations have been attacked in recent years, Wisconsin's version is sure to encounter some form of challenge in the near future. What
the Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately will hold in determining the constitutionality of this statute will depend on three related factors. The first
factor is whether the challenge proceeds under the United States or the
Wisconsin Constitution. The second factor is how much deference the Wisconsin Supreme Court is willing to give the legislature. In reality, this is an
examination of how prone the Wisconsin court is to applying rational basis
scrutiny to legislative enactments. The third factor will be the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's respect for precedent or, conversely, how willing it proves
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at -., 256 N.W.2d at 671.
38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
Id. at 160 n.18, 695 P.2d at 681-82 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.18.
647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).

123. Id. at 786 n.3.
124. See WIs. STAT. §§ 655.017, 893.55(4) (1985-86).
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to be in expanding its lists of fundamental rights and suspect classifications
under the strict and intermediate scrutiny standards.
A.

Federal ConstitutionalChallenges to Wisconsin's Noneconomic
Damage Limitation

For the purpose of analyzing a challenge to Wisconsin's noneconomic
damage limitation, the preeminent consideration is whether the challenge
proceeds under the federal or state constitution. The other two factors are
actually subparts of this factor. Should the statute be challenged only
under the federal Constitution, the outcome is likely to be an upholding of
the statute under the rational basis standard.
One of the tenets of our federal system is that Wisconsin courts, like all
state courts, are bound by the holdings of the United States Supreme Court
when deciding federal constitutional issues.' 2 5 In the area of federal equal
protection, the United States Supreme Court's holdings have limited lower
courts' ability to use a standard more rigorous than the rational basis standard. To date, the list of suspect classes and fundamental rights under the
strict scrutiny standard is quite limited.126 As of this writing, the United
States Supreme Court recognizes no fundamental right under the federal
Constitution to recover damages in a tort action." 7 Plaintiffs who have
characterized the right to collect damages as "fundamental" have not been
successful.1 2 I Similarly, a limitation on damages is not among the few classifications the Court considers a suspect classification.129 Plaintiffs who
have advanced this argument have also been rebuffed.' 30 A similarly short
list of classifications meriting federal intermediate scrutiny have been cre125. But see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (finding
a "fair and substantial" relationship between a statutory limitation and the classification of injured
patients, though the Supreme Court has yet to extend use of the federal intermediate scrutiny test
to classifications other than illegitimacy, gender and indigency); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978) (disregarding the limited number of federal intermediate scrutiny classifications
in striking down a limitation on damages as a violation of federal equal protection as well as state
equal protection).
126. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. Kan. 1981); Jones v. State Bd. of

Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Johnson, 273 Ind. at 374, 404 N.E.2d at 585; Sibley
v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La.

1981); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661,406 A.2d 704 (1979); Beatty v. Akron
City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981); State ex reL Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.
2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
129. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

130. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.
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ated by the United States Supreme Court. Only gender, illegitimacy, and
indigency merit this scrutiny at present.
There is thus a high probability that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
would apply the rational basis standard to a federal equal protection challenge. A federal equal protection challenge to which the court applies the
rational basis standard is bound to fail. Courts apply the rational basis
standard when neither a fundamental right nor suspect classification is involved.13 The legislature does not have to choose the best or even the wisest means of achieving its goals; 132 the classification will be upheld if any set
of facts may be conceived to justify it. 133 As one commentator has observed, use of the rational basis test "was tantamount to an announcement
of the constitutionality of the legislation." 1 3 In sum, a federal equal protection challenge to Wisconsin's noneconomic damage cap would fail, since
the Wisconsin Supreme Court is bound by federalism to apply federal equal
protection standards as they have been construed by the United States
Supreme Court.
Failure is also the result if the challenge is brought on federal substantive due process grounds. This is due to the Supreme Court's observation,
over a century ago, that plaintiffs have no "property" right to any particular measure of damages.1 35 Since 1937, the Court has given legislatures
large amounts of deference when determining the constitutionality of social
and economic legislation; 136 the limitation on damages has been considered
a classic case of economic legislation. 137 The Wisconsin Supreme Court is
bound by federalism to apply federal substantive due process as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court.

1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (plurality opinion); Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

131. See State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d 308, 396 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1986); State ex reL
Jones v. Gerhardstein, 135 Wis. 2d 161, 400 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 141 Wis. 2d 710,
416 N.W.2d 883 (1987).
132. Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979).
133. Committee to Retain Judge Byers v. Elections Bd., 95 Wis. 2d 632, 291 N.W.2d 616 (Ct.
App. 1980).
134. See Bice, supra note 30, at 698.
135. In a widely quoted passage from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Court held:

A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.... Rights of
property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due
process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the
whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.

Id. at 134.
136. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

137. See, e.g., Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786.
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On the issue of the need for a quid pro quo, if the challenge is brought
on federal constitutional grounds, the outcome is failure. The courts that
have struggled with the United States Supreme Court's holding on this doctrine agree that a substitute is not necessary to limit or abrogate a common
13 8
law remedy.
In all likelihood, the Wisconsin Supreme Court will not be persuaded by
any of these federal challenges. Although the federal bases of challenge do
not look promising, challenges under the Wisconsin Constitution remain as
an alternative to be explored.
B.

Wisconsin State Constitutional Challenges: The TraditionalEqual
Protection Standardsand the Substantive Due Process Standard

Realistically, neither traditional state equal protection nor state substantive due process standards hold much promise for the challenging plaintiff
under Wisconsin law. In large part, this is due to the fact that Wisconsin
considers its due process and equal protection clauses to be substantially
coextensive with their federal counterparts.1 39 This means that under the
state equal protection clause, Wisconsin lmits the scope of its fundamental
rights and the reach of its suspect classifications to similar rights and classifications found in the federal Constitution.1" If the rights and classifications are the same, it is reasonable to assume that the outcomes will be the
same. Certainly, it is true that Wisconsin has yet to consider a limitation on
damages to be an impingement on a fundamental right, nor has it found
such a limitation to create a suspect classification. Judging from the case
law, on a state constitution equal protection challenge, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court would apply the rational basis standard in examining the
state limitation on noneconomic damages.
Even stronger evidence of Wisconsin's likelihood of applying the rational basis standard to a state constitution equal protection challenge is
found in State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie.'4 1 In that case, the court applied
the rational basis standard in examining the constitutionality of the patient
138. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
139. See Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 67 n.3, 398 N.W.2d 756, 759 n.3 (1987) (protection
afforded by article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution is substantially equivalent to the
federal equal protection clause); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 571
n.1, 259 N.W.2d 316, 318 n.1 (1977) (article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution is substantially equivalent to the federal fourteenth amendment due process clause); see also State ex rel.
Cresci v. Schmidt, 62 Wis. 2d 400, 414, 215 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1974); State ex reL Sonneborn v.
Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 50, 132 N.W.2d 249, 252 (1965).
140. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 98 Wis. 2d 261, 296 N.W.2d 736 (1980); County of Milwaukee v.
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980).
141. 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
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compensation review panel system then in effect. 142 The court found that
Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin Statutes14 3 satisfied Wisconsin's "five criteria
of reasonableness."144
As is to be expected under the rational basis test, the Strykowski court
was quite deferential to the legislature's attempts to rectify the medical malpractice crisis:
This court is not concerned with the wisdom or correctness of the
legislative determination ... ; its task is to determine only whether

there was a reasonable basis upon which the legislature might have
acted.
We believe there is a rational basis upon which the legislature
could and did act when enacting Chapter 655.
[The legislature's] findings, while not binding upon the court,
carry great weight. The legislature cited a sudden increase in the
number of malpractice suits, in the size of awards, and in malpractice insurance premiums, and identified several impending dangers:
increased health care costs, the prescription of elaborate "defensive"
medical procedures, the unavailability of certain hazardous services
4
and the possibility that physicians would curtail their practices.1 1

142. Former Wis. STAT. §§ 655.02-.22 (1985-86). The Wisconsin patient compensation review panel system was subsequently repealed by the Wisconsin legislature by 1985 Act 340, effective June 14, 1986. 1985 Wis. Laws 1497.
143. Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin Statutes referred to in Strykowski is entitled "Health Care
Liability and Patients Compensation." Wis. STAT. ch. 655 (1985-86). Wisconsin's noneconomic
damage limitation is also part of Chapter 655. See Wis. STAT. § 655.017 (1985-86).
144. Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509, 261 N.W.2d at 442-43. Wisconsin's reasonableness test
provides:
(1) All classifications must be based on substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only and must not be
so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers included within a class.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof.
(5) The characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of other classes as
to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation.
Id. at 509 n.8, 261 N.W.2d at 442 n.8 (footnote omitted); see also Dane County v. McManus, 55
Wis. 2d 413, 198 N.W.2d 667 (1972) (applying the same test).
After applying this test to the Strykowski facts, the court reached the following conclusions:
Medical malpractice actions are substantially distinct from other tort actions. The classification is plainly germane to the act's purposes. The law applies to all victims of health
care providers as described therein. The legislature declares that the circumstances surrounding medical malpractice litigation and insurance required the enactment of the
legislation.
Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509, 261 N.W.2d at 442-43.
145. 81 Wis. 2d at 508, 261 N.W.2d at 442 (citations omitted).
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Though Strykowski is not factually on point, it still provides a strong
indication of how the Wisconsin Supreme Court will most likely react
when presented with an equal protection challenge to the noneconomic
damage limitation. In Strykowski, the court cited the factors upon which
the legislature based its opinion, and concluded there was a rational basis
for the legislature's findings. This deference closely parallels that found in
cases which apply the rational basis standard to damage limitations.'
Finally, a Wisconsin Constitution substantive due process challenge is
not likely to result in the Wisconsin court striking down the state's
noneconomic damage limitation. Again, the reason is the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's holding that the state due process clause is coterminous
with the federal due process clause. On the issue of the quid pro quo, a
similar outcome is likely. A good indication of how the Wisconsin Supreme
Court would rule on a quid pro quo challenge to the state's noneconomic
damage limitation is found in Strykowski. There the court .observed that
the United States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly require the quid pro
quo. 14 7 Because the United States Supreme Court did not require a quid
pro quo, the Wisconsin court likewise held that it did not consider one necessary. 148 Based on this holding, it seems likely that Wisconsin will not be
receptive to a state constitution due process challenge.
IV.

CHALLENGE UNDER THE STATE INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY STANDARD

While state courts are limited by the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court when applying federal constitutional standards, there are no
such restrictions on these courts when applying their state constitutions.
As one state judge noted, a state is "free to grant individuals more rights
than the Federal Constitution requires" under its state constitution. 14 9 The
United States Supreme Court has also explicitly expressed its approval of
this notion.' 5 0 Based on the unlikelihood of striking down the damage stat146. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435-37 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 162, 695 P.2d 665, 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 386
(1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (plurality opinion).
147. Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 520, 261 N.W.2d at 447-48.
148. Id.
149. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, -, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980).
150. In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982), the Court held "a
state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly than this Court reads
the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a different
analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee." Id. at 293; see also Brennan, supranote 37,
at 500-01 (recognizing that state courts may decline to follow U.S. Supreme Court holdings where
a state court is applying its own constitution); Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclu-
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ute under any of the standards heretofore discussed, the state equal protection intermediate scrutiny standard is the only remaining judicial avenue.15 1
Opponents of the damage limitations have had some success where they
have persuaded state courts to apply this more rigorous equal protection
standard.1 52 Under this standard, the court examines the evidence for itself.
In the case of a damage limitation challenge, the Wisconsin court would
examine the correspondence between the statutory classification and the
legislative goal of insuring physicians at reasonable rates.1 53 Other issues
for the court's consideration would include the statute's success in abating
the malpractice insurance crisis,15 4 whether premium rates have
dropped,1 55 and whether the number of insured physicians has increased.1 56
In making the challenge, plaintiffs would need to stress that the statute
is arbitrary and creates undue hardship on a small, unfortunate group of
plaintiffs. There is some limited authority from other states' case law and in
the scholarly commentary for such an assertion to the Wisconsin court. In
Carson v. Maurer,15 7 the New Hampshire Supreme Court found the "legislative goal of rate reduction and the means chosen to attain that goal is
weak." 15' 8 One of the reasons for that finding was that few plaintiffs suffer
sionaryRule: The Latest Example of "New Federalism"in the States, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 166, 19199 (1987) (application of the principle in the criminal law context). See generally articles cited
supra note 37.
151. A "legislative option" also exists. This option is unique to Wisconsin, since the legislature put a "sunset" provision into Wisconsin's noneconomic damage cap. See Saichek, supra note
10. In 1991, the legislature must vote to continue the limitation; if it takes no action, the provision
will expire. Advocates for repeal of the noneconomic damage cap could thus lobby the legislature
to allow the provision to expire.
152. See, e.g., Carson, 120 N.H. at 925, 424 A.2d at 825; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978); see also Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (applying
intermediate scrutiny but remanding for additional evidence of nexus between statutory means
and ends). But see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)
(upholding damage limitation under intermediate scrutiny).
153. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135.
154. Jones, 97 Idaho at -, 555 P.2d at 414.
155. Minter, Task Force on Tort Reform Research Paper on Limiting Recovery of
Noneconomic Damages, 60 Wis. B. BULL. 15, 54 (July 1987).
156. Id.
157. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
158. Id. at -., 424 A.2d at 836-37. In Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group, Chief Justice Bird,
in dissent, expressed a similar opinion. She pointed out that only fourteen persons had been
awarded total damages over $250,000 that year. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 172, 695 P.2d 665, 690, 211
Cal. Rptr. 368, 393 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see also CaliforniaEqual Protection Challenge,
supra note 19, at 951. The problem has been described as follows:
[A]ny reduction in the amount of recoverable damages will lead to a decrease in the
amount of paid-out damage awards for medical malpractice insurers, thus theoretically
decreasing premium costs. If such a decrease would in fact occur, a substantial relationship between means and ends for this statutory provision would be established. Unfortu-
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noneconomic damages in excess of the statutory limit of $250,000.159 The
inference the court sought to make was that the limitation had little or no
effect on the malpractice insurance crisis, since almost all plaintiffs had
damages less than the limitation. The statute thus created a classification
for which there was arguably no reason. The classification did not bear a
"fair and substantial" relationship to the legislature's goals, and therefore
160
the statute was struck down.
Wisconsin's damage limitation is subject to the same criticism, only to a
greater degree. Wisconsin's damage limitation of $1,000,000 is four times
higher than New Hampshire's. If it is indeed true that "only 2.5 percent of
all medical malpractice claimants receive noneconomic damages in excess
of $100,000,,,161 then Wisconsin's limitation has a miniscule impact on
amounts paid out. 62 If a challenger could persuade the court to apply intermediate scrutiny, Wisconsin's court might find there was no fair and substantial relation between the statutory means and legislative ends.
A second argument in favor of the application of the state intermediate
scrutiny standard would be that the amount and type of the limitations
themselves are arbitrary. Some states have enacted a limitation on total
damages in reaction to the malpractice insurance crisis. 163 Others only
limit noneconomic damages. 6' While the rationale is identical for both an attempt to bring the malpractice insurance crisis under control - the
means chosen are significantly different. The disparity in types and
amounts of the limitations may lend credence to the argument that legislanately, the effectiveness of this provision is diminished by a number of competing factors.
First, paid-out damage awards constitute only a small part of total insurance premium
costs. Second, and of primary importance, few individuals suffer noneconomic damages in
excess of $250,000. Furthermore, in light of the total lack of statistical evidence available
to the legislature, the amount of noneconomic losses exceeding $250,000 was probably
unknown at the time of MICRA's enactment, and is probably negligible today.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a description of the MICRA legislation referenced above, see supra
note 59.
159. Carson, 120 N.H. at _, 424 A.2d at 836-37.
160. Id. at

-,

424 A.2d at 838.

161. Minter, supra note 155, at 54.
162. What this argument fails to take into account is that a statutory ceiling on claims may
make it easier from an actuarial standpoint to set malpractice premium rates. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d
at 163, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The counterargument is that no figures on the
effects of the damage limitation on reducing insurance premiums are available at present. Minter,
supra note 155, at 54.
163. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) ($150,000
per claim/$300,000 per occurence); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ($500,000).
164. See, e.g., Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 137, 695 P.2d at 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 368 ($250,000);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) ($250,000).
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tures had no hard facts from which they could infer that a cap of a certain
amount would abate the malpractice insurance crisis.
Though the state intermediate standard is the most promising avenue of
challenge, in the final analysis this challenge is not likely to succeed. Currently, Wisconsin has limited the scope of its state intermediate scrutiny to
classifications similarly scrutinized by the United States Supreme Court. 16 5
Thus, Wisconsin is most likely to apply the rational basis standard to its
statute. This assertion is based on the fact that the majority of courts apply
that standard, as well as Wisconsin precedent indicating the court's deference toward legislative attempts to rectify the malpractice insurance crisis.
V.

CONCLUSION

Wisconsin's noneconomic damage limitation has yet to be challenged.
However, based on the number of similar challenges in recent years, Wisconsin's statute will likely encounter a challenge in the near future.
Wisconsin is unlikely to apply federal equal protection strict or intermediate scrutiny to its statute, due to the principles of federalism. The United
States Supreme Court has yet to find the limitation of damages to create a
suspect class or impinge a fundamental right. Similarly unlikely would be
the Wisconsin court striking down the statute on either a federal or state
substantive due process/quid pro quo theory. Here, too, Wisconsin considers its due process clause coextensive with its federal counterpart, and the
federal clause has not been used to find a damage limitation
unconstitutional.
Currently, the most promising avenue for challengers of the Wisconsin
statute is to seek to persuade the Wisconsin Supreme Court to expand its
use of intermediate scrutiny to include damage limitations such as the one
at hand. Under such a standard, the Wisconsin court would independently
examine the relationship between statutory means and legislative ends.
While the state intermediate scrutiny standard is the challenger's best
avenue of attack, and to be successful he must persuade the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to expand its use of that standard, in the final analysis it is
not likely that the court would be receptive to the argument. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to expand the state's fundamental rights and
suspect classes, though it clearly has the right to do so under the Wisconsin
Constitution. Based on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's refusal to break
165. See State v. Hill, 91 Wis. 2d 446, 283 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1979) (intermediate scrutiny applied to gender-based classification); Blumreich v. Kaquatosh, 84 Wis. 2d 545, 267 N.W.2d

870 (1978) (intermediate scrutiny applied to illegitimacy).
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from the United States Supreme Court's classifications, a challenge to Wisconsin's noneconomic damage limitation is likely to fail.
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